Arm your friends. Arm your enemies. Then wait to figure out which is which (or, in some cases, don't bother with the second part).
President Carter with the Shah of Iran. $60B worth in 2015 money (21B worth of 1979 money). Unfortunately, money couldn't buy the Shah love.
President Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East, Donal Rumsfeld, planning out the Mid-East's future. 1.7 trillion USD later.....things aren't quite as they were planned....Who could have guessed?
President Regan with the early Taliban (kind of like Genesis before Phil Collins started singing). The hope was that these guys and Saddam would hedge against Iran and the USSR. Well....one trillion dollar liberation later...here we are (who could have thought they'd sell the US out to OBL? Who would have thought that Phil Collins would sell out Genesis to popular music? Somethings may never be known....)
President Clinton with the Saudi Monarchy. By this time, the US and KSA both hated Saddam. However, the US had soured on the Taliban while KSA was still funding them (with other members of the royal family also funding Al Qaeda). The US willl gladly give you military hardware Tuesday for oil today.
This is the second installment of an analysis of US support for nations in the Middle East. The first
installment discussed the web of military aid spent on various actors since the 1950s and looked a bit at the "military butterfly effect" the US has experienced since getting involved. This installment will look deeper at our frenemies of India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).
If we work our way East to West, we would start with India and Pakistan (or, more accurately, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). It is a tradition of failing empires to try and gain as much influence over their former colonies as possible. Britain would be no exception. Here, the divide and conquer mentality was alive and well with Indian independence (1947) and the subsequent partition into the aforementioned nations (with Bangladesh being part of Pakistan - as odd as that sounds, since the two territories didn't share a language, border, or any other major similarities, excluding religion). This partition would lead to a mass exodus of Hindus from Pakistan and Bangladesh and Muslims from India proper. This would result up to 1.5M deaths and unknown cultural and economic damages.
An additional feature of this partition would be a strong enmity between Pakistan and India. These nations would fight four wars between 1947 and 1999, with the Pakistanis being humbled each and every time. This was considered a major feat, as Pakistan was though to have an almost invincible military and India having been humbled, in its own right, by an impoverished China in 1962. It was also this instability which would allow the United States to become the benefactor of Pakistan (to the tune of 67B in aid) as a hedge against both China and an unaligned India (which would go on to buy much of its military equipment from the USSR). Thus would begin Pakistan's desire to counter the defeats by India via funding of Islamic militants and acquisition of the atomic bomb (which would be largely funded by non-other-than an oil rich KSA). After all, if you can't beat them in symmetrical warfare, ensure they are on edge due to the asymmetrical alternative. This funding of groups such as the Taliban and Lashkar-E-Taiba would indeed allow for proxy fights against Pakistan's perceived threats, but would have the unintended consequence of fueling a low grade civil war inside of Pakistan and a full-out civil war in Afghanistan. [It's probability worth pointing out that not only where Pakistan and KSA directly funding the Taliban during the 1980s Soviet invasion, the Taliban were also being funded directly by the USA under the direction of Democratic Congressman Charlie Wilson. Another way to look at that is the USA was giving military aid to Pakistan as a hedge against China, and was giving military aid to KSA as a hedge against newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran (as well as tons of money in exchange for oil). Both Pakistan and KSA were then giving some of those resources to the Taliban, which was also receiving additional direct handouts from the USA. That's what is called a three-fer. The later Taliban government would, coincidently, only be recognized by, you guessed it, Pakistan, KSA, and the United Arab Emirates (for good measure).]
Moving West, we come to Persia. As previously mentioned, Persia had been more/less stable up through this time (with its own imperial ambitions crushed after the monarchy was thrown out of Western Afghanistan in 1700s and subsequent intermittent occupations by Russia and Britain). However, post WWII and with the rise of anti-monarchy sentiment throughout much of the world, Persia would opt to limit the ruling monarchy and elect Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh as Prime Minister. Mosaddegh was often characterized as a firm nationalist, religious moderate, and reformer (much compared to Turkey's Ataturk). However, the two major differences between Iran and Turkey were that 1) Turkey was able to militarily fend off the imperialists and 2) Turkey had no major oil reserves (plus Turkey joined NATO - so, there's that). When Mosaddegh would attempt to nationalize the major British oil company in 1953 (which had been keeping Britain happy since 1935), Britain convinced the United States that such nationalization would lead Persia on a path to the dark side and ultimately to allegiance to the Soviet Union. Thus, Mosaddegh was deposed (interestingly enough by President Teddy Roosevelt's son) and replaced with the Shah. The Shah would received 21.2B worth of US aid to help cement his power and loyalty up through 1979. Although money can buy you the most powerful military in the region, it cannot buy you love (especially when you are perceived as a brutal dictator by a large swath of your public). After he was deposed by a combination of right-wing religious zealots and left-wing militants, the left and the right would find that they did not agree and would then go on to fight each other. Within a year, the right had won out and a very, very, very resentful government would be founded which was non-too-happy with the US's prior support of the Shah and his subsequent sanctuary. [This lesson should have been learned earlier as much of the Arab Spring would result in joint ousting of secular dictators and subsequent religious control - See Egypt, Libya, Syria, and the earlier Hamas elections in Palestine - Note to self: Left Wing + Religious Zealot joint uprisings result in subsequent civil war, with the zealots usually winning out due to fervor, innate organizational cohesion, and a perceived duty to a higher being.].
A final note on Iran - the Supreme Leader's government would see the Taliban in Afghanistan as a direct threat and had prepared for war with them on more than one occasion. However, the enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend scenario didn't really develop since presidents from Reagan to Bush II saw Iran as a bigger threat (the US even shot down an Iranian civilian passenger air-liner over international waters while protecting Iraqi vessels during the Iran-Iraq war). Granted, Clinton did see Osama Bin Laden as a rising threat, he was not able to Obama him (Obama is a verb here).
Moving again West, we come to Iraq. Although this nation had been run by the aforementioned Hashemites (with the strings pulled either directly or indirectly by the British), the nationalist fervor spreading across the Middle East in the 1950s could not be stopped. This nationalism (combined with the pan-Arab ethos stemming from Egypt's Nasser) would lead to a series republican coups and ultimately the rise of Saddam Hussein. Even though Iraq was happy to sell its oil to whomever, the nationalist pan-Arab spirit, combined with massive oil wealth, would lead to friction with its religiously zealous monarchy neighbors. This friction would turn to war, first with Iran and then with Kuwait (not to mention token involvement with the Arab/Israeli wars). Although the US hadn't been fond of Iraq's support of Arab nationalism (at the expense of imperial influence), it saw Iraq as a bulwark against the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, the US would arm Saddam in his eight year war against the Iranians (with which the Iranians fought with previously supplied US equipment and an injection of new arms via the Iran-Contra affair).
After the war (with which some million people may have died), Iraq decided that it would need to regain its footing with a smaller war against Kuwait (Kuwait had been part of Ottoman Mesopotamia, with Mesopotamia becoming Iraq and Kuwait becoming a separate British protectorate and ultimately a religiously strict monarchy similar to KSA; thus Iraq somehow felt Kuwait belonged to it...that was combined with Iraqi claims of Kuwait slant drilling Iraqi oil reserves and it's perceived permission from the USA for an invasion - see "April Glaspie"). Either way, it was at this time that a clear beginning-of-the-end would befall the brutally violent dictator Saddam; who just so happened to practice a secular, virulently anti-Islamic militant, pro-women's rights, pro-education, and sociality inclusive regime (Sunni favoritism over Shiites at the higher levels of government notwithstanding - remember, it's all relative, plus, Saddam's Foreign Minister was actually a Christian). This 1.7T dollar downfall would be funded primarily by the US taxpayer. It would also create a tragic power vacuum throughout Iraq and a great opportunity for Iran to make up for some of its regional influence losses during its war with Saddam. [A note on Saddam - although we armed him during the eight years of war with Iran, including components of chemical weapons, his human rights record was long considered to be far more brutal than our stated adversaries of Assad, Qadafi, and even the Ayatollahs].
Next we come to Saudi Arabia. As previously mentioned, much of this territory was originally promised to the Hashemites. However, after Britain lost interest in protecting the weak monarchy, which controlled the two holiest sites in Islam, the Saudi militants made short work of the existing monarch's forces. In order to achieve this victory, the Saudi militants needed to ensure a strong coalition amongst their allied tribesmen. This was done under the auspices of Islam and, specifically, under the flag of the ultra puritanical Wahhabism. With this monarchy exerting 100% control over the populace, having unlimited wealth due to its oil reserves, and no interest in the ongoing Arab nationalists movement, it seemed to be a perfect partner for the United States. This point was emphasized as US oil reserves flat-lined in the 1960s while oil use was drastically increased to power the Vietnam war effort. The dilemma was, how do you enlist the Saudi government when they don't need you? The answer? Ensure that the KSA is terrified of its pan-Arabist neighbors and assure them that they'll have access to more military arms than they can shake a stick at (130B worth of weapons to be precise). In return, the US would get 1 million barrels of oil per day and a supposedly pliant partner in a hostel region. (with hostel being an interesting word, since much of the hostility was facilitated by the US's own largess).
At this point, one may wonder what an ultra-wealthy totalitarian monarchy, dependent upon fervently religious adherents, and terrified of the combination of secular Arab states, a large Shiite minority, and an anti-monarchy Shiite state next door should do? Well, the first thing is to ensure that your own religious militants do not overthrow your monarchy (they saw the Shah's fate as their own potential future). This can be done via unchallenged state control of everything under the guise of religious authority, consolidation of power amongst the Saudi family, exorbitant funding of madrassas (espousing the same Wahabi militant principals) throughout the poorest parts of the Islamic word, paying to send your domestic militants to fight in wars from Afghanistan to Bosnia, funding atomic bomb research in Pakistan (with the understanding that KSA will have one on layaway), and funding organizations (such as the Taliban) which are nominally loyal to the cause.
[It is ironic that Pakistan and KSA would end up having more to fear from their proxy militants than from the nation-states those proxies were designed to counter. From the Grand Mosque Seizure in 1979 to the ongoing civil strife in Pakistan, these organic militants seem to see their creators as an enemy nearly to the same degree they see the United states. Yet, regardless of this, neither KSA or Pakistan seems to believe that these proxies present an existential threat to their governments to the same degree as Iran and India are to KSA and Pakistan, respectively. This is demonstrated by the ongoing Pakistani funding of LET and the KSA's refusal to go all-in against the Al Qaeda controlled provinces of Yemen - yet commencing immediate military action against the Shiite rebels within that same country. This is compared to militias funded by the Iranians (Hezbollah, Hamas) which, to a large degree, maintain loyalty to the regime and are, arguably, much more pliable and pragmatic (and arguably more secular).]
Next time, we'll talk about Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey.